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EXAMINER

FISCHER, ANDREW J

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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3627

DATE MAILED: 01/11/2005

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

## Office Action Summary

**Application No.**

09/847,035

**Applicant(s)**

MURREN ET AL.

**Examiner**

Andrew J. Fischer

**Art Unit**

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-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

### Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

### Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 19 November 2004.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**.      2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

### Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-6, 8-10 and 12-48 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) 20-37, 48 is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-6, 8-10, 12-19 and 38-47 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

### Application Papers

- 9) ☒ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.  
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).  
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

### Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All    b) ☐ Some \*    c) ☐ None of:
- ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
  - ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
  - ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

\* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

### Attachment(s)

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)  | 4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413)<br>Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____ |
| 2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)                                   | 5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)             |
| 3) <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)<br>Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____ | 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____  |

## **DETAILED ACTION**

### ***Acknowledgements***

1. Applicants' amendment filed November 19, 2004 is acknowledged. Accordingly, claims 1-6, 8-10, and 12-48 remain pending.
2. All references in this Office Action to the capitalized versions of "Applicants" refers specifically the Applicants of record. References to lower case versions of "applicant" or "applicants" refers to any or all patent "applicants." Unless expressly noted otherwise, references to "Examiner" in this Office Action refers to the Examiner of record while reference to or use of the lower case version of "examiner" refers to examiner(s) generally.
3. This application in an image file wrapper ("IFW") application. Applicants' response is therefore broken down before being placed into the IFW system (*i.e.* claims, remarks, drawings, etc. are separated and independently scanned). To ensure proper handling by the Examiner, the Examiner highly recommends Applicants place the application serial no (*e.g.* 06/123,456) in a header or footer (or other appropriate area) of *each* page submitted. At the very least, the Examiner highly recommends this practice for all pages listing the claims.
4. This Office Action is written in OACS. Because of this, the Examiner is unable to control formatting, paragraph numbering, font, spelling, line spacing, and/or other word processing issues. The Examiner sincerely apologizes for these errors.

### ***Restriction***

5. Applicants' election with traverse of Group I (claims 1-6, 8-10, 12-19 and 38-47) in the reply filed on November 19, 2004 is acknowledged. The traversal is on the ground(s) that

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“searches involved for all three claim groups would substantially overlap . . . .”<sup>1</sup> This is not found persuasive because Applicants failed to argue that the groups of Inventions are not patentable distinct. An example will help illustrate the Examiner’s point.

6. First, suppose two hypothetical groups of Inventions—Group A (claims 1-9) and Group B (claims 10-20)—each having claims 1 and 10 respectively as their only independent claims. Next, suppose that all the claim elements in Group A can be summarized as  $E_A$ . Supposed that Group B contains some of the claim elements from Group A (*i.e.*  $E_A$ ) and some additional elements not found in Group A, *i.e.*,  $E_B$ . Therefore Group B could be summarized as having both  $E_A + E_B$  claim elements.

In a first scenario, if we agree that Group A *is not patentably distinct* from Group B (*i.e.*, claim 1 is not patentably distinct from claim 10), the Examiner agrees that a restriction is improper. See MPEP §§ 810 and 808.02 1<sup>st</sup> ¶. This makes sense because in this first scenario, suppose an examiner sets forth an erroneous restriction which ultimately results in a divisional application. However, in such a case, an obvious non-statutory double patenting rejection is proper since we agreed (by definition) that claims 1 and 10 are not patentable distinct. However the erroneous restriction would bar the double patenting rejection causing a chaotic situation. Without the restriction and because claims 1 and 10 are not patentably distinct, the obvious non-statutory double patenting rejection is proper. See MPEP §804 II B. 1.

In a second scenario, if we agree that Group A *is patentably distinct* from Group B (*i.e.* claim 1 is patentable distinct from claim 10), a restriction is proper. And by definition, there can be no double patenting. However because of the mandatory electronic searches required for

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<sup>1</sup> Applicants’ Remarks filed November 19, 2004, Page 16, ~lines 11 and 12.

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allowance in class 705,<sup>2</sup> the examiner would be *required* to search for patentably distinct features E<sub>B</sub>—even if Group A (*i.e.* E<sub>A</sub>) was searched and considered allowed. This additional search is *prima facie* evidence to support a restriction. See MPEP §808.02 (C).

Should Applicants expressly state on the record that the groups of inventions are not patentably distinct after each and every claim amendment submitted and provide appropriate evidence in support thereof, the Examiner may reconsider the restriction in light of the amended claims and Applicants' evidence. However, based upon the claims as currently filed and because Applicants have failed to argue that the groups of inventions are not patentably distinct, the requirement is still deemed proper and is therefore made FINAL.

7. Claims 20-37 and 48 are therefore withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.142(b), as being drawn to a nonelected Invention, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Applicants timely traversed the restriction requirement in the reply filed on November 19, 2004.

### *Specification*

8. The specification is objected to as failing to provide proper antecedent basis for the claimed subject matter. See 37 CFR 1.75(d)(1) and MPEP §608.01(o). Correction of the following is required:

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<sup>2</sup> See *Notification of Required and Optional Search Criteria for Computer Implemented Business Method Patent Applications in Class 705, and Request for Comments*, Federal Register, Vol. 66, No. 108, 30167, June 5, 2001.

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- a. In claim 1, the phrase “wherein the communication involves transferring information to subscribers in advance of receiving requests from the subscribers pertaining to the information . . . .”

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC §112 1<sup>st</sup> Paragraph***

9. The following is a quotation of the 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

10. Claims 1-6, 8-10, 12-19 and 38-47 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claims contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventors, at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

11. In claim 1, the phrase “wherein the communication involves transferring information to subscribers in advance of receiving requests from the subscribers pertaining to the information” has not been sufficiently disclosed such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Applicants’ had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the date of application. Appropriate correction is required.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC §112 2<sup>nd</sup> Paragraph***

12. The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

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13. Claims 1-6, 8-10, 12-19 and 38-47 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

14. In claim 1, it is unclear what the phrase “a different set of information” is in reference to. In other words, different from what? For example and for purposes of appeal, the Examiner interprets the phrase to mean “a different set of information” when compared to *e.g.* the Provda newspaper.

15. Also in claim 1, the phrase “wherein the communication involves transferring information to subscribers in advance of receiving requests from the subscribers pertaining to the information” is indefinite. It is the Examiner’s position that this is an impossible limitation since the transferred information must always “pertain” to the request submitted by the subscriber. Unless the publisher can somehow guess, this limitation will never occur. Because this is an impossible limitation, the scope of the claim can not be determined. Applicants are reminded that “when an impossible limitation, such as a nonsensical method of operation, is clearly embodied within the claim, the claimed invention must be held invalid.” *Process Control Corp. v. Hydrex Corp.*, 190 F.3d 1350, 1359, 52 USPQ2d 1029, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

16. Finally in claim 1, it is unclear if the “transferring information” as recited in line 23 and “the information” as recited in line 24 is the same or different from “a different set of information” recited in line 21. The Examiner starts with the presumption that use of different terms in the same claim connotes a different meaning. See *CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fielder GmbH & Co. KG*, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317, 55 USPQ2d 1804, 1810 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different

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terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”).<sup>3</sup> For appeal purposes, it is the Examiner’s position that the two (2) sets of information are different.

17. The Examiner finds that because the claims are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph, it is impossible to properly construe claim scope at this time. See *Honeywell International Inc. v. ITC*, 68 USPQ2d 1023, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Because the claims are indefinite, the claims, by definition, cannot be construed.”). However, in accordance with MPEP §2173.06 and the USPTO’s policy of trying to advance prosecution by providing art rejections even though these claim are indefinite, the claims are construed and the art is applied *as much as practically possible*.

### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC §102***

18. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. §102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office Action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for a patent.

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States. . . .

(e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United States and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English language.

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<sup>3</sup> See also *Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson*, 821 F.2d 627, 632, 3 USPQ2d 1109, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that the meaning of claim terms must be defined in a manner that is consistent with its appearance in other claims in the same patent).



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19. Claims 1-6, 8-10, 12-19 and 38-47, as understood by the Examiner are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) as being anticipated by Fisher et. al. (U.S. 5,835,896)(“Fisher”). Fisher discloses as discussed in the previous non final office action (mailed March 16, 2004, “First Non Final Office Action”).

20. Claims 1-6, 8-10, 12-19 and 38-47, as understood by the Examiner are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) as being clearly anticipated by Anderson et. al. (U.S. 6,671,674 B1).

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC §103***

21. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. §103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office Action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

22. Claims 1-6, 8-10, 12-19 and 38-47, as understood by the Examiner, are alternatively rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Fisher in view of Lawrence (U.S. 5,915,209).<sup>4</sup> It is the Examiner’s principle position that the claims are anticipated because of the inerencies in Fisher.

However if not inherent, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify Fisher as taught by Lawrence to include any missing elements.

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<sup>4</sup> See MPEP §2112 expressly authorizing alternative §102/§103 rejections when the question of inherency is present in the anticipation rejection.

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23. After careful review of the specification and prosecution history, the Examiner is unaware of any desire—either expressly or implicitly—by Applicants to be their own lexicographer and to define a claim term to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning. Therefore, the Examiner starts with the heavy presumption that all claim limitations are given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. See *Bell Atlantic Network Services Inc. v. Covad Communications Group Inc.*, 262 F.3d 1258, 1268, 59 USPQ2d 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.”); *CCS Fitness Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.*, 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 USPQ2d 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (There is a “heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning.”). See also MPEP §2111.01 and *In re Zletz*, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).<sup>5</sup>

In accordance with the ordinary and accustomed meaning presumption, during examination the claims are interpreted with their “broadest reasonable interpretation . . . .” *In re Morris*, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also MPEP §2111.

However, if Applicants disagree with the Examiner and have either (a) already used lexicography or (b) wish to use lexicography and therefore (under either (a) or (b)) desire a claim limitation to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicants in their next response to expressly indicate<sup>6</sup> the claim limitation

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<sup>5</sup> It is the Examiner’s position that “plain meaning” and “ordinary and accustomed meaning” are synonymous. See e.g. *Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.*, 274 F.3d 1336, 1342, 60 USPQ2d 1851, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A]ll terms in a patent claim are to be given their plain, ordinary and accustomed meaning . . .”).

<sup>6</sup> “Absent an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Wenger Manufacturing Inc. v. Coating*

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at issue and to show where in the specification or prosecution history the limitation is defined.

Such definitions must be clearly stated in the specification or file history. *Bell Atlantic*, 262 F.3d at 1268, 59 USPQ2d at 1870, (“[I]n redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from the ordinary meaning, the intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly redefine’ a claim term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine the claim term”).<sup>7</sup> The Examiner cautions that no new matter is allowed.

Applicants are reminded that failure by Applicants in their next response to properly traverse this issue in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered a desire by Applicants to forgo lexicography in this application and to continue having the claims interpreted with their broadest reasonable interpretation.<sup>8</sup> Additionally, it is the Examiner’s position that the above requirements are reasonable.<sup>9</sup> Unless expressly noted

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*Mach. Sys., Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1225, 1232, 57 USPQ2d 1679, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). “In the absence of an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor’s claim terms take on their ordinary meaning. We indulge a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Teleflex Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.*, 299 F.3d 1313, 1325, 63 USPQ2d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and quotations omitted).

<sup>7</sup> See also *Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.*, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996), (“[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, *as long as* the special definition of the term is *clearly stated* in the patent specification or file history. [Emphasis added.]”); *Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd.*, 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Such special meaning, however, must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the field of the invention.”). See also MPEP §2111.01, subsection titled “Applicant May Be Own Lexicographer” and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled “New Terminology.”

<sup>8</sup> See 37 C.F.R. §1.104(c)(3) which states in part: “the examiner may rely upon admissions by applicant . . . as to *any matter* affecting patentability . . . . [Emphasis added.]”

<sup>9</sup> The Examiner’s requirements on this matter are reasonable on at least two separate and independent grounds. First, the Examiner’s requirements are simply an express request for

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otherwise by the Examiner, the preceding discussion on claim interpretation principles applies to all examined claims currently pending.

24. To the extent that the Examiner's interpretations are in dispute with Applicants' interpretations, the Examiner hereby adopts the following definitions—under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard—in all his claim interpretations.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, while the following list is provided in accordance with *In re Morris*, the definitions are a guide to claim terminology since claim terms must be interpreted in context of the surrounding claim language.<sup>11</sup> Finally, the following list is not intended to be exhaustive in any way:

**Computer:** “Any machine that does three things: accepts structured input, processes it according to prescribed rules, and produces the results as output.” Computer Dictionary, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Microsoft Press, Redmond, WA, 1997.<sup>12</sup> **Client:** “3. On a local area network or Internet,

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clarification of how Applicants intend their claims to be interpreted so that lexicography (or even an *attempt* at lexicography) by Applicants is not inadvertently overlooked by the Examiner. Second, the requirements are reasonable in view of the USPTO's goals of compact prosecution, productivity with particular emphasis on reductions in both pendency and cycle time, and other goals as outlined in the USPTO's The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Strategic Plan, February 3, 2003 available at [www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/index.htm](http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/index.htm) (last accessed January 9, 2005).

<sup>10</sup> While most definition are usually cited because these terms are found in the claims, the Examiner may have provided additional definition(s) to help interpret words, phrases, or concepts found in the definitions themselves or in the prior art.

<sup>11</sup> See e.g. *Brookhill-Wilk 1 LLC v. Intuitive Surgical Inc.*, 334 F.3d 1294, 1300, 67 USPQ2d 1132, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (abstract dictionary definitions are not alone determinative; “resort must always be made to the surrounding text of the claims in question”).

<sup>12</sup> Based upon Applicants' disclosure, the art of record, and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in this art as determined by the factors discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* is an appropriate technical dictionary known to be used by one of ordinary skill in this art. See e.g. *Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp.*, 318 F.3d 1363, 1373, 65 USPQ2d 1865, 1872 (Fed. Cir. 2003) where the Federal Circuit used the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* (3d ed.) as “a technical dictionary” to define the term “flag.” See also *In re Barr*, 444 F.2d 588, 170 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1971)(noting that its

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a computer that accesses shared network resources provided by another computer (called a server).” *Id.* **Server**: “2. On the Internet or other network, a computer or program that responds to commands from a client.” *Id.*

**Database** “A file composed of records, each containing fields together with a set of operations for searching, sorting, recombining and other functions.” *Id.* **Relational Database** “A database or database management system that stores information in tables—rows and columns of data—and conducts searches by using data in specified columns of one table to find additional data in another table. In a relational database, the rows of a table represent records (collections of information about separate items) and the columns represent fields (particular attributes of a record). In conducting searches, a relational database matches information from a field in one table with information in a corresponding field of another table to produce a third table that combines requested data from both tables. . . . Microcomputer database products typically are relational databases. *Compare* flat-file database, inverted-list database.” *Id.*

**Information** “2 a . . . (3): FACTS, DATA” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10<sup>th</sup> Edition, Merriam-Webster Inc., Springfield, M.A., 1997.

**Pertain** “1 a (1) : too belong as a part, member, accessory, or product” *Id.*

25. Because applicants frequently misunderstand the historical order of definitions and their corresponding senses, the following excerpts from the “Explanatory Notes” in Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary are provided:

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appropriate to use technical dictionaries in order to ascertain the meaning of a term of art) and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled ‘New Terminology.’

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**Definitions****Division of Senses**

A boldface colon is used in this dictionary to introduce a definition. . . . It is also used to separate two or more definitions of a single sense. . . . Boldface Arabic numerals separate senses of a word that has more than one sense. . . . Boldface lowercase letters separate the subsenses of a word. . . . Lightface numerals in parentheses indicate a further division of senses. . . .

**Order of Senses**

The order of senses within an entry is historical: the sense known to have been first used in English is entered first. This is not to be taken to mean, however, that each sense of a multisense word developed from the immediately preceding sense. It is altogether possible that sense 1 of a word has given rise to sense 2 and sense 2 to sense 3, but frequently sense 2 and sense 3 may have risen independently of one another from sense 1.

When a number sense is further subdivided into lettered subsenses, the include of particular subsenses with a sense is based upon their semantic relationship to one another, but their order is likewise historical: subsense 1a is earlier than subsense 1b, 1b is earlier than 1c, and so forth. Divisions of subsenses indicated by lightface numerals in parentheses are also in historical order with respect to one another. Subsenses may be out of historical order, however, with respect to the broader numbered senses. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, pp 19a-20a.

26. With respect to claims 1-6, 8-10, 12-19 and 38-47, the Examiner respectfully reminds Applicants that: "A system is an apparatus." *Ex parte Fressola* 27 USPQ2d 1608, 1611 (B.P.A.I. 1993)(citations omitted). Additionally, "[c]laims in apparatus form conventionally fall into the 35 U.S.C. §101 statutory category of a 'machine.'" *Ex parte Donner*, 53 USPQ2d 1699, 1701 (B.P.A.I. 1999)(unpublished), (Paper No. 34, page 5, issued as U.S. Patent 5,999,907). Therefore, it is the Examiner's position that for prior art purposes and in accordance with MPEP §2173.06, *supra*, Applicants' system claims are considered "product," "apparatus," or more specifically, "machine" claims.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Products may be either machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter. MPEP §2106 IV B. 2 (a).

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27. Because Applicants have chosen product claims, Applicants are also reminded that functional recitations using the word “for,” “configured to,” or other functional terms (*e.g.* see claim 1 which recites “configured to identify one or more of the plurality of subscribers”) have been considered but are given little patentable weight<sup>14</sup> because they fail to add any structural limitations and are thereby regarded as intended use language. A recitation of the intended use in a product claim must result in a structural difference between the claimed product and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed product from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it reads on the claimed limitation. *In re Casey*, 370 F.2d 576, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967) (“The manner or method in which such machine is to be utilized is not germane to the issue of patentability of the machine itself.”); *In re Otto*, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See also MPEP §§ 2114 and 2115. Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the claim interpretation principles in this paragraph apply to all product claims currently pending. By way of example only, the Examiner recommends removing the functional language where functional language is not desired.

### ***Response to Arguments***

28. Applicants’ arguments filed July 16, 2004 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. As understood by the Examiner, it is agreed Fisher (nor any other reference) does not disclose selecting and communicating a set of information to a subscriber without ever receiving an indication of which information to be conveyed to the subscriber. However, how

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<sup>14</sup> See *e.g. In re Gulack*, 703 F.2d 1381, 217 USPQ 401, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(stating that although all limitations must be considered, not all limitations are entitled to patentable weight.).

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then does Fisher or any system for that matter know which set of information to convey if it performs this “communication” in *advance of* receiving requests pertaining to that information? Such a limitation is impossible since the system would have *no idea* what information to convey to a particular subscriber if the system had to convey the information in *advance of* receiving a request for that information.

29. Applicants’ remaining arguments have been considered but are not persuasive.

### ***Conclusion***

30. Applicants’ amendment necessitated the new grounds of rejection presented in this Office Action. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP §706.07(a). Applicants are reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 C.F.R. §1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire **THREE MONTHS** from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within **TWO MONTHS** of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the **THREE-MONTH** shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than **SIX MONTHS** from the date of this final action.

31. References considered pertinent to Applicants’ disclosure are listed on form PTO-892.

32. The following two (2) citations to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) apply to this Office Action: MPEP citations to Chapters 100, 200, 500, 600, 700, 1000, 1100,



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1300, 1400, 1500, 1700, 1800, 2000, 2100, 2200, 2500, 2600, and 2700 are from the MPEP 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, Rev. 2, May 2004. All remaining MPEP citations are from MPEP 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, August 2001.

33. Because this application is now final, Applicants are reminded of the USPTO's after final practice as discussed in MPEP §714.12 and §714.13 and that entry of amendments after final is *not* a matter of right. "The refusal of an examiner to enter an amendment after final rejection of claims is a matter of discretion." *In re Berger*, 279 F.3d 975, 984, 61 USPQ2d 1523, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Furthermore, suggestions or examples of claim language provided by the Examiner are just that—suggestions or examples—and do not constitute a formal requirement mandated by the Examiner. Unless stated otherwise by an express indication that a claim is "allowed," exemplary claim language provided by the Examiner to overcome a particular rejection or to change claim interpretation has *not been addressed* with respect to other aspects of patentability (e.g. §101 patentable subject matter, §112 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph written description and enablement, §112 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph indefiniteness, and §102 and §103 prior art). Therefore, any claim amendment submitted under 37 C.F.R. §1.116 that incorporates an Examiner suggestion or example or simply changes claim interpretation will nevertheless require further consideration and/or search and a patentability determination as noted above.

34. In accordance with *In re Lee*, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344-45, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Examiner finds that the references How Computers Work Millennium Ed. by Ron White; How Networks Work, Millennium Ed. by Frank J. Derfler et. al.; and How the Internet Works, Millennium Ed. by Preston Gralla are additional evidence of what is basic knowledge or common sense to one of ordinary skill in this art. Each reference is cited in its entirety.

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
Moreover, because these three references are directed towards beginners (see *e.g.* “User Level Beginning . . .”), because of the references’ basic content (which is self-evident upon review of the references), and after further review of the entire application and all the art now of record in conjunction with the factors as discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that these three references are primarily directed towards those of low skill in this art. Because these three references are directed towards those of low skill in this art, the Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in this art must—at the very least—be aware of and understand the knowledge and information contained within these three references.

35. Also in accordance with *In re Lee*, the Examiner finds that the Borland’s Paradox for Windows User’s Guide is additional evidence of what is basic knowledge or common sense to one of ordinary skill in this art. The reference is cited in its entirety. Paradox for Windows User’s Guide exemplifies a typical relational database system. Because of the reference’s basic content (which is self-evident upon examination of the reference) and after further review of the entire record including the prior art now of record in conjunction with the factors as discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that the Paradox for Windows User’s Guide is primarily directed towards those of low skill in this art. Because the reference is directed towards those of low skill in this art, the Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in this art must—at the very least—be aware of and understand the knowledge and information contained within the reference.

36. In accordance with the USPTO’s goals of customer service, compact prosecution, and reduction of cycle time, the Examiner has made every effort to clarify his position regarding claim interpretation and any rejections or objections in this application. Furthermore, the

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Examiner has again provided Applicants with notice—for due process purposes—of his position regarding his factual determinations and legal conclusions. The Examiner notes and thanks Applicants for their “Remarks” (beginning on page 16 of their response filed on July 16, 2004) traversing the Examiner’s positions on various points. If Applicants disagree with any additional factual determination or legal conclusion made by the Examiner in this Office Action whether expressly stated or implied,<sup>15</sup> the Examiner respectfully reminds Applicants to properly traverse the Examiner’s position(s) in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) in their next properly filed response. By addressing these issues now, matters where the Examiner and Applicants agree can be eliminated allowing the Examiner and Applicants to focus on areas of disagreement (if any) with the goal towards allowance in the shortest possible time. If Applicants have any questions regarding the Examiner’s positions or have other questions regarding this communication or even previous communications, Applicants are strongly encouraged to contact Examiner Andrew J. Fischer whose telephone number is (703) 305-0292. If attempts to reach the Examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the Examiner’s immediate supervisor, Robert Olszewski, can be reached at (703) 308-5183. The fax number for facsimile responses is now (703) 872-9306.



Andrew J. Fischer  
Primary Examiner  
Art Unit 3627

AJF

January 9, 2005

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<sup>15</sup> *E.g.*, if the Examiner rejected a claim under §103 with two references, although not directly stated, it is the Examiner’s implied position that the references are analogous art.